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THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE OBLIGATES CONGRESS TO
ENACT A FEDERAL PLAN TO SECURE U.S. ELECTIONS
AGAINST FOREIGN CYBERATTACKS
ABSTRACT
While foreign adversaries continue to launch cyberattacks aimed at
disrupting elections in the United States, Congress has been reluctant to take
action. After Russia interfered in the 2016 election, cybersecurity experts
articulated clear measures that must be taken to secure U.S. election systems
against foreign interference. Yet the federal government has failed to act.
Congress’s reticence is based on a misguided notion that greater federal
involvement in the conduct of elections unconstitutionally infringes on states’
rights. Both state election officials and certain congressional leaders operate
under the assumption that federalism principles grant states primacy in
conducting federal elections.
This Comment dispels the myth that Congress must defer to states to regulate
federal elections. The text of the Elections Clause in Article I, Section 4 of the
U.S. Constitution confers to Congress final authority in determining the “Times,
Places and Manner” of federal elections. Therefore, the system of administering
federal elections is based on decentralization rather than federalism.
The risk of foreign interference in U.S. elections was a precise reason the
founders bestowed on Congress ultimate control over federal elections. States
and municipalities lack the capacity to effectively combat foreign cyber
invasion. This Comment makes the case that Congress has a responsibility to
exercise its power under the Elections Clause to create a federal plan to secure
voter registration databases and voting mechanisms against cyberattacks in
order to protect the integrity of American democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
Does federalism prevent Congress from taking action to secure U.S.
elections against foreign cyberattacks? Since its founding, the United States has
grappled with how to balance the authority of state governments against that of
the federal government in managing elections.1 Article I, Section 4 of the U.S.
Constitution, often called the “Elections Clause,” grants each state the power to
designate the “Times, Places and Manner” of federal elections, but it also states
that “Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.”2
Despite the seemingly sweeping power designated to Congress by the Elections
Clause, scholars and the Supreme Court have traditionally viewed the regulation
of elections and the voting process through the lens of state sovereignty.3
Currently, U.S. election infrastructure consists of a heterogeneous array of voter
registration procedures, registered voter databases, pollbooks, voting machines,
and vote counting mechanisms that vary from state to state.4 States are also
inconsistent in the degree to which they delegate election management to
counties and municipalities.5
Two hundred and thirty years ago in the Federalist Papers, Alexander
Hamilton explained the rationale for embedding Congress’s power to regulate
elections into the Constitution.6 Hamilton explained that leaving control of
federal elections solely in the hands of state governments could create an
existential risk to the nation.7 With the Elections Clause, the drafters of the
Constitution “reserved to the national authority a right to interpose, whenever
extraordinary circumstances might render that interposition necessary to its
safety.”8 Hamilton presciently recognized that the threat of foreign interference

1
Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State’s Rights, Last Rites, and Voting Rights, 47 CONN.
L. REV. 481, 514 (2014) (“This struggle between the states and the national government with respect to the
apportionment of powers over elections has waxed and waned throughout American history.”).
2
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (emphasis added).
3
See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 535 (2013) (stating the Voting Rights Act of 1965
which granted federal oversight over the voting laws of certain states was “a drastic departure from the principle
of federalism”); Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV. 747, 753 (2016) (describing
“election law federalism” as consisting of “multiple sovereigns” at the federal, state, and local government
levels).
4
Weinstein-Tull, supra note 3, at 754 (listing the differences in voting hours, funding schemes, absentee
voting rules, and voter registration, or the “nuts and bolts of the election”).
5
Id.
6
THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton).
7
Id. (“With so effectual a weapon in [state legislators’] hands as the exclusive power of regulating
elections for the national government, a combination of few such men, in a few of the most considerable States,
where the temptation will always be the strongest, might accomplish the destruction of the union.”).
8
Id. (emphasis added).
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in U.S. elections would be such an extraordinary circumstance.9 He wrote in
Federalist 59 that “a firm union of this country, under an efficient government,
will probably be an increasing object of jealousy to more than one nation of
Europe; and that enterprises to subvert it will sometimes originate in the
intrigues of foreign powers.”10
In 2016, for the first time in the history of this nation, Hamilton’s prediction
of foreign interference came true when Russia attempted to interfere with and
influence the U.S. presidential election.11 Along with a campaign of
misinformation, Russia directly attacked U.S. election systems.12 Beginning as
early as 2014, the Russian government directed extensive activity against U.S.
election infrastructure at the state and local levels.13 A 2018 report by the Senate
Intelligence Committee revealed that Russian operatives attempted to hack into
the election systems of each of the fifty states.14 Russia attacked a point of
vulnerability in U.S. election infrastructure—states’ supposed primacy in
conducting federal elections.15 According to the Senate Intelligence Report,
“[s]tate elections officials, who have primacy in running elections, were not
sufficiently warned or prepared to handle an attack from a hostile nation-state
actor.”16 Hamilton’s interpretation of the Elections Clause suggests that Russian
aggression is a clear reason for Congress to exert its constitutional authority to
protect U.S. election infrastructure.17
Despite the obvious risk that our democracy may be undermined by foreign
interference, some members of Congress have expressed reluctance to take a
greater role in protecting federal elections.18 State officials have also pushed
back and even rejected federal help in securing their state and local election

9

Id.
Id.
11
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., SECURING THE VOTE: PROTECTING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 13
(2018) [hereinafter NAS REPORT].
12
Id. at 14.
13
S. SELECT COMM. ON INTEL., S. REP. NO. 116-XX, REPORT ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES
CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION 3 (2019) (partially redacted) [hereinafter SENATE
INTELLIGENCE REPORT].
14
Id. at 12.
15
Id. at 4 (“Russian efforts exploited the seams between federal authorities and capabilities, and
protections for the states.”).
16
Id.
17
See infra Part III.
18
See, e.g., Dean Dechiaro, Election Officials Want Security Money, Flexible Standards, ROLL CALL
(Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/election-officials-want-security-money-flexiblestandards (describing Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s reluctance to bring House-passed election
security bills up for votes in the Senate).
10
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systems out of concern for maintaining state sovereignty.19 Although Congress
has previously overridden the right of states to conduct elections by passing the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) under the Fifteenth Amendment, it has yet to
invoke its full Elections Clause powers.20 With its holding in Shelby County v.
Holder in 2013, the Supreme Court gutted the VRA, tilting the balance toward
state autonomy in conducting elections.21 Therefore, Congress can no longer
rely solely on its power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments to supersede
state authority over elections.22
This Comment argues that the threat of foreign attacks against U.S. election
infrastructure requires Congress to exercise its power under the Elections Clause
to enact legislation establishing a uniform system for federal elections.23 This
Comment takes the position that foreign cyber intrusion is the type of existential
threat for which the Elections Clause gives Congress the authority to act.
Because the Constitution grants Congress the ultimate authority to regulate
federal elections, the creation of a federal system for elections does not intrude
on state sovereignty.
Part I describes the current cybersecurity threat to U.S. election
infrastructure. A paucity of federal regulations poses significant risks in the face
of such twenty-first century threats. This Part describes the scope of Russia’s
attacks on state and local election systems during the 2016 election and catalogs
the recommendations of cybersecurity experts in how best to secure election
infrastructure against future attacks. By detailing how state and local election
officials responded ineffectively to cyberattacks in 2016 and leading up to the
2018 election, this Comment predicts that without a comprehensive federal plan,
Russia and other foreign actors may successfully disrupt future federal elections.

19

See infra Part III.B.
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10301; see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 303 U.S. 301, 308
(1966) (upholding the invalidation of state laws restricting voter access to the polls as an appropriate means for
carrying out Congress’s constitutional responsibilities under the Fifteenth Amendment).
21
570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
22
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution are often called the
“Reconstruction Amendments.” The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited slavery. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The
Fourteenth Amendment established birthright citizenship and created due process and equal protection rights
against state action. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fifteenth Amendment guaranteed the right to vote regardless
of color or condition of previous servitude. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
23
This Comment does not address one aspect of Russia’s interference in the 2016 election—a social
media campaign of disinformation aimed at influencing voters. For a summary of that issue and
recommendations for confronting Russia’s efforts, see Alex Stamos, Sergey Sanovich, Andrew Grotto & Allison
Berke, Combatting State-Sponsored Disinformation Campaigns from State-aligned Actors, in SECURING
AMERICAN ELECTIONS: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR ENHANCING THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE 2020 U.S.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND BEYOND 43 (Michael McFaul ed., 2019).
20
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Next, Part II explores the history of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
constitutional provisions that confer differential authority to states and the
federal government to regulate federal elections. This Part describes how the
Court’s recognition of congressional authority to control federal elections has
waxed and waned over the past 150 years. The Court has previously granted
relatively broad powers to Congress to invalidate state legislation that infringed
on citizens’ right to vote under the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.24 The expansion of congressional authority under the
Reconstruction Amendments was followed by a reversion to greater state
sovereignty over elections with the Court’s holding in Shelby County.25 This Part
explains that Shelby County represents a shift in the Court’s view towards greater
state autonomy in conducting elections. Therefore, Congress must find another
source of authority to enact federal election legislation. Part II argues that such
authority can be found in the Elections Clause, which provides an
underrecognized source of power for Congress to regulate federal elections.
Despite the Supreme Court’s reluctance to infringe on states’ purported
sovereignty in conducting elections, the Elections Clause gives Congress the
power to supersede any state action regarding elections. The text and purpose of
the Elections Clause provide a system for U.S. elections based on
decentralization rather than federalism.
Part III contends that, for three main reasons, Congress has an obligation to
use its Election Clause authority to enact a federal election plan. First, foreign
attacks on U.S. election infrastructure fall within the category of “extraordinary
circumstances” as described by Hamilton, which provides the impetus for
Congress to regulate the “Times, Places and Manner” of federal elections.26
Cyber invasion by Russia and potentially other nation-states is a matter of
national security that requires a federal response. Second, state and local
officials lacked the capacity to manage the attacks during the 2016 U.S. election.
Cyberattacks will continue to intensify without a coordinated national response,
and states cannot be left to defend election infrastructure from such attacks.
Third, insecure voting systems in several states violate the rights of voters under
the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing voters from confidently knowing that
their votes will count.27 Therefore, despite the Supreme Court’s holding in
Shelby County, Congress also has a responsibility to step in where states have
24

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 544; Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 1, at 514–15, 518.
26
U.S. CONST. Article I, § 4; THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton).
27
See Curling v. Kemp, 334 F. Supp. 3d 1303, 1328 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (“A wound or reasonably threatened
wound to the integrity of a state’s election system carries grave consequences beyond the results in any specific
election, as it pierces citizens’ confidence in the electoral system and the value of voting.”).
25
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failed in securing their election systems pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s enforcement provision.
Lastly, Part IV provides a prescriptive solution and suggests legislation that
Congress may enact. Namely, Congress should enact a federal election plan that
provides for federal oversight of uniform procedures and standards that each
state must follow while maintaining the decentralized conduct of elections.28
The plan should include federally mandated standards for maintaining
registration databases and electronic pollbooks. The federal plan should also
require that all states use the same mechanism to generate voter-verified paper
ballots, which are read by federally certified optical scanners. Finally, a federal
election plan should mandate that all states submit to federal post-election audits.
I.

THE CURRENT CYBERSECURITY THREAT TO U.S. ELECTION
INFRASTRUCTURE

Securing U.S. elections and citizens’ confidence in the election process is of
paramount importance to maintain this nation’s republican form of government.
After the 2016 presidential election, evidence is clear that foreign powers are
capable of interfering with U.S. election systems to, at minimum, erode voter
confidence and at worst, suppress voter turnout, manipulate vote tallies, and
sway election results.29 Along with hacking into the Democratic National
Committee’s servers and launching a disinformation campaign on social media,
Russia directly targeted U.S. election infrastructure and continues to do so.30
Cybersecurity experts are fully aware of the vulnerability of U.S. election
systems and have developed clear, consensus recommendations on how best to
secure elections against cyberattacks.31 The onus is now on the federal
government to create a national plan that will implement these
recommendations.
While decentralization provides some protection from a single crippling
attack, it also creates a barrier to generating a cohesive and uniform response to
foreign cyberattacks.32 Although states and municipalities play a critical
administrative role in conducting elections, they are generally ill-prepared to
28
See NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 16 n.11 (noting decentralization of U.S. elections is one aspect of
the current U.S. election system that protects against cyberattacks).
29
Kim Zetter, The Crisis of Election Security, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/09/26/magazine/election-security-crisis-midterms.html.
30
See generally SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13; NAS REPORT, supra note 11.
31
See infra Part I.B.
32
Lawrence Norden, How to Secure Elections for 2020 and Beyond, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 23,
2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/how-secure-elections-2020-and-beyond.
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confront a threat from a foreign nation-state.33 States and municipalities have
demonstrated an inability to handle attacks from a foreign nation-state and have
still not taken adequate steps to secure election infrastructure at the local level.34
Therefore, a foreign threat to U.S. elections requires a uniform federal response,
and Congress must pass legislation to preserve the integrity of federal elections.
A. Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election
The 2016 U.S. election presented challenges that states, municipalities, and
the nation had not previously faced. Russia made a concerted to effort to
interfere with and disrupt many aspects of the election.35 One line of attack was
to launch cyberattacks against electronic components of state election systems.36
Actors sponsored by the Russian government “obtained and maintained access
to multiple U.S. state or local electoral boards.”37 Although the Senate
Intelligence Committee found no evidence that vote tallies were changed or that
voter registration records were altered, the committee’s insight is limited in this
regard because a full forensic analysis has not been done.38 What is certain is
that Russian government-affiliated actors “conducted an unprecedented level of
activity” that targeted state election systems leading up to the 2016 election.39
Russian hacking into U.S. election infrastructure was a “watershed moment”
in the history of U.S. elections.40 Protecting election infrastructure became a
national security issue when Russia targeted cyberattacks against U.S. voter
databases and election systems.41 The Intelligence Community first detected
evidence of hacking into state election systems in the summer of 2016.42 In July

33
Id. (“[I]t is not reasonable to expect each of these state and local election officials to independently
defend against hostile nation-state actors.”) (statement of Bob Brehm, co-executive director of the New York
State Board of Elections) (internal quotation marks omitted); see infra Part III.B.
34
See infra Part III.B.
35
SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 3.
36
NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 1.
37
Id. (quoting OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN
RECENT US ELECTIONS iii (2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.)
38
NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 2 n.3. The NAS committee was not aware of any ongoing investigation
into the possibility that vote tallies were changed. Deficiencies in “intelligence gathering, information sharing,
and reporting” leave some uncertainty about the exact consequences of Russia’s attacks. Id.; SENATE
INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 5; Zetter, supra note 29.
39
SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 5.
40
NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at xii.
41
Id. at 117.
42
SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 6. The U.S. Intelligence Community consists of
sixteen agencies working under the coordination of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The
sixteen agencies are: Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security
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2016, Illinois noticed unusual activity on the state’s Board of Elections voter
registry website.43 An FBI investigation discovered that the activity resulted in
data being exfiltrated from the voter registration database.44 Ultimately, the FBI
determined that Russian actors successfully penetrated Illinois’s voter
registration database, viewed multiple database tables, and eventually accessed
up to 200,000 voter registration records.45 Russian cyber actors were in a
position to delete or change voter data, although there is no evidence that they
did so.46
Further, evidence shows that Russian operatives targeted several small
jurisdictions around the country. In the summer of 2016, General Staff of the
Russian Army (GRU) officers sought “access to state and local election
computer networks by exploiting known software vulnerabilities” on state and
local government websites.47 By mid-August 2016, federal cybersecurity
personnel became confident that Russian cyber actors were probing the election
infrastructures and voter registration databases of several states.48 By late
September of that year, U.S. intelligence agencies identified twenty-one states
that were targeted by Russian government cyber actors.49 Eventually,
intelligence officials concluded that Russia had attempted to invade the election
systems of all fifty states.50
In one line of attack, GRU officers sent spear-phishing emails to over 120
Florida county election officials.51 The emails contained an attached Word
document carrying a virus that would permit the GRU to access an infected
computer.52 The FBI believes, through this operation, the GRU was able to gain
access to the network of at least one county government in Florida.53 Eventually,
Agency/Central Security Service, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S.
Department of State, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Air Force, U.S.
Army, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Navy. NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 1 n.2. Russian
activity began as early as 2014. SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 3.
43
SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 6.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 22.
46
Id.
47
Michael McFaul & Bronte Kass, Understanding Putin’s Intentions and Actions in the 2016 U.S.
Presidential Election, in SECURING AMERICAN ELECTIONS, supra note 23, at 5, 14.
48
SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 7.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 12.
51
Herbert Lin, Alex Stamos, Nate Persily & Andrew Grotto, Increasing the Security of U.S. Election
Infrastructure, in SECURING AMERICAN ELECTIONS, supra note 23, at 17, 18.
52
ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 51 (2019).
53
Id.
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a Russian operative was indicted by Special Counsel Robert Mueller for probing
election websites of certain rural counties in Georgia, Florida, and Iowa in
October 2016.54
Russia also targeted electronic pollbook systems in several states.55 In one
example of an attack on Election Day in 2016, registered voters in North
Carolina were denied the right to vote when the local electronic pollbook
systems could not locate their records.56 Although hacking was never proven to
be the cause of the electronic pollbook discrepancy, a forensic analysis was not
conducted as county election officials in North Carolina declined the FBI’s offer
to investigate.57
The Intelligence Community understood the seriousness of the foreign
attacks.58 In October 2016, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
the Office of the Director on National Intelligence issued a joint statement on
election security, which revealed that the probing of state election systems had
originated from “servers operated by a Russian company.”59 The statement also
warned state and local governments about the cybersecurity threats and asked
them to seek assistance from DHS.60 In January 2017, then-DHS Secretary Jeh
Johnson issued a statement designating U.S. election infrastructure as a part of
the nation’s critical infrastructure, which made election systems an ongoing
“priority for cybersecurity assistance and protections” from DHS.61 Members of
the Intelligence Community generally agreed that some of Russia’s motives for
the cyberattack were to sow discord and undermine voters’ confidence in the

54

Indictment at 26, U.S. v. Netyksho, No. 18-cr-00215 (D.D.C. Jul. 13, 2018).
Benjamin Wofford, The Hacking Threat to the Midterms Is Huge. And Technology Won’t Protect Us,
VOX (Oct. 25, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/25/18001684/2018-midterms-hacked-russiaelection-security-voting.
56
Id. Electronic pollbooks are electronic voter check-in databases that are increasingly being used in
place of paper voter rolls in precincts around the U.S. See infra Part I.B.
57
Wofford, supra note 55.
58
SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 7–8.
59
Press Release, DHS & ODNI Election Sec., Joint Statement on Election Security (Oct. 7, 2016),
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2016/item/1635-joint-dhs-and-odnielection-security (“We believe, based on the scope and sensitivity of these efforts, that only Russia’s senior-most
officials could have authorized these activities.”).
60
Id.
61
Press Release, Jeh Johnson, DHS Sec’y, Statement on the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a
Critical Infrastructure Subsector (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/06/statement-secretaryjohnson-designation-election-infrastructure-critical. Election infrastructure is comprised of “storage facilities,
polling places, and centralized vote tabulations locations used to support the election process, and information
and communications technology to include voter registration databases, voting machines, and other systems to
manage the election process and report and display results on behalf of state and local governments.” Id.
55

MALEMPATI_12.2.20

2020]

12/2/2020 2:44 PM

THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE

427

U.S. election system.62 However, intelligence officials believed that the general
public did not fully comprehend the threat and had a dim understanding of the
vastness of Russia’s attack during the 2016 election.63
The attacks did not subside after the 2016 election. Russia continued to
attack U.S. election infrastructure for the purpose of interfering with the 2018
midterm elections.64 The Intelligence Community was clearly aware of the
ongoing threat from Russia.65 As one U.S. cybersecurity expert noted before the
2018 midterm elections, “The Russians will attempt, with cyberattacks and with
information operations, to go after us again. They’re doing it right now.”66 An
October 11, 2018, DHS Report stated, “We judge that numerous actors are
regularly targeting election infrastructure, likely for different purposes,
including to cause disruptive effects, steal sensitive data, and undermine
confidence in the election. We are aware of a growing volume of malicious
activity targeting election infrastructure in 2018[.]”67 There is now abundant
evidence that Russia targeted the campaigns of at least a dozen House and Senate
candidates in the 2018 midterm elections.68 The Intelligence Community also
believes that Russia continued its activity against state and local election
systems.69 The extent to which Russia succeeded in its endeavors in 2018 is still
not known.70
Russia has demonstrated it has sufficient sophistication and knowledge of
U.S. voting patterns to understand that cyberattacks on local election systems
could cause significant disruption.71 Although it may be difficult to change vote
tallies across the country in national elections, cyber actors can access databases
in particular districts, manipulate voter files, and cause enough voter suppression
to impact the outcome.72 Therefore, an attack on a few key battleground states

62

SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 35–36.
Wofford, supra note 55.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. (quoting Eric Rosenbach, former Pentagon Chief of Staff).
67
SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 21.
68
Wofford, supra note 55.
69
See SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 10 (stating that prior to the 2018 midterm
election, DHS determined “numerous actors are regularly targeting election infrastructure, likely for different
purposes, including to cause disruptive effects, steal sensitive data, and undermine confidence in the election”).
70
See Lin et al., supra note 51, at 18–19 (“[T]here is no evidence that votes were actually changed and
that no lasting damage was done to voter registration databases. Nonetheless, these incidents should be viewed
as precursors or dress rehearsals for similar attacks against the 2020 U.S. presidential election.”).
71
Eric Manpearl, Securing U.S. Election Systems: Designating U.S. Election Systems as Critical
Infrastructure and Instituting Election Security Reforms, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 168, 175 (2018).
72
Id. at 173–74; Zetter, supra note 29.
63
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during a presidential race could swing the election.73 Because small
manipulations are easier to perpetrate without detection, the risk that
cyberattacks may affect the result of an election is “greatest when the electorate
is evenly divided and vote counts are close, as has been the case recently in a
number of Presidential elections.”74 Attacks on specific competitive districts
during congressional elections could also substantially change the composition
of the federal legislature.75 No proof exists that such attacks have occurred, but
they are certainly a risk for the future.76 The consensus opinion among the
Intelligence Community is that the threat of foreign cyberattacks on U.S.
election systems persists.77 And the risk is not just from Russia. Evidence shows
that China, Iran, North Korea, and ISIS have all conducted cyber intrusions
against U.S. election infrastructure.78

B. Recommendations of Cybersecurity Experts to Strengthen U.S. Election
Infrastructure
Election cybersecurity experts generally agree that certain remedies would
create a more secure U.S. election system. Because of long-standing concerns
about insecure voting systems and the recent recognition of foreign cyberattacks,
the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (“NAS”)
appointed an ad hoc committee to consider the future of voting in the United
States.79 The NAS committee determined that, due to the events of the 2016
election and the ongoing threat of cyberattacks, the current U.S. system of voting
must evolve.80 In its report, the NAS committee noted that because of the new
73
Manpearl, supra note 71, at 175; NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 16 n.11; see Zetter, supra note 29
(describing how a few thousand missing votes and a 537-vote victory for George W. Bush in Florida determined
the result of the 2000 presidential election).
74
Lin et al., supra note 51, at 19.
75
Manpearl, supra note 71, at 175; NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 16 n.11.
76
Zetter, supra note 29.
77
SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 43 (quoting Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S.
Elections: Open Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 117 (2017) (statement of Alex
Halderman, Professor of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Michigan)); see Jeremy Herb, Brian
Fung, Jennifer Hansler & Zachary Cohen, Russian Hackers Targeting State and Local Governments Have Stolen
Data, US Officials Say, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/22/politics/russian-hackers-election-data/index.
html (Oct. 23, 2020, 11:39 AM) (reporting that “Russian state-sponsored hackers” targeted state and local
government and stole voter registration information in the weeks leading up to the 2020 election).
78
William Roberts, Election Security: The Fight to Secure the Vote, 33 WASH. LAW. 12, 14 (2018).
79
The committee was charged with: (1) documenting the current state of technology, standards, and
resources for voting technologies; (2) examining the challenges arising out of the 2016 federal election;
(3) evaluating advances in current and upcoming technology that can improve voting; and, (4) providing
recommendations to make voting “easier, accessible, reliable, and verifiable.” NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at
3–4.
80
Id. at 121.
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foreign threat, “[w]e must think strategically and creatively about the
administration of U.S. elections” and must “seriously reexamine . . . the role of
federal and state governments in securing our elections.”81 While cybersecurity
experts are not in a position to opine on the constitutionality of federal authority
to regulate states in conducting federal elections, they have a strong, coherent,
consensus opinion on how best to secure election infrastructure against
cybersecurity threats. Experts recommend measures to secure two critical
aspects of elections: voter registration databases and vote-casting mechanisms.82
First, voter registration lists must be complete and accurate.83 The Help
America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) required each state to create a statewide
voter database, rather than leave the maintenance of voter registration to counties
and municipalities.84 The administration of voter registration databases requires
two main large scale tasks.85 Election administrators must (1) maintain the
correct status and relevant information of citizens who are properly registered to
vote; and (2) deliver precinct-specific lists of registered voters to each precinct.86
Because of the complexity and flexibility needed to maintain accurate, upto-date lists of registered voters, lists are by necessity kept electronically.87
Electronic voter registration databases are easier than paper counterparts to
manage and maintain but are vulnerable to cyberattacks.88 And in many states,
“databases containing voter registration lists are connected, directly or
indirectly, to the Internet or to state computer networks.”89 This connectivity
creates a significant risk of cyber invasion and manipulation.90 Manipulation of
voter registration data would cause chaos when voters arrive at the polls and find
their names have been removed from the rolls.91 Removing or changing data for
a small number of voters in contentious congressional races or in swing states

81

Id.
Lin et al., supra note 51, at 17.
83
NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 59.
84
Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545) (requiring “a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive, computerized statewide
voter registration list defined, maintained, and administered at the state level”).
85
Lin et al., supra note 51, at 17.
86
Id.
87
NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 57–61.
88
Id. at 61.
89
Id. at 57.
90
See infra Part I.C. Russia breached online voter databases in Illinois and Arizona, obtaining personal
information on tens of thousands of registered voters. SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 22–24;
NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 25.
91
SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 2.
82
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for a presidential race could change the results of an election.92 The NAS
recommends that election administrators routinely assess the integrity of voter
registration databases and put in place systems that detect evidence of probing
or tampering with the system.93 The Senate Intelligence Committee recommends
updating software in state voter registration systems and maintaining paper
backup copies of registration databases.94
Managing statewide voter registration databases requires states to deliver
precinct-specific lists, also known as pollbooks, to each precinct.95 Pollbooks,
which can either be paper-based or electronic, are used to verify voter eligibility
and check-in voters.96 Over 80% of jurisdictions use preprinted paper pollbooks
to check-in voters, but the use of electronic pollbooks (e-pollbooks) is
increasing.97 Between 2012 and 2016, there was a 75% increase in use of epollbooks, and now almost half of voters are checked in electronically.98
E-pollbooks, which may or may not be networked or connected to the
internet, provide some advantages over paper pollbooks. E-pollbooks generally
speed up the check-in process and can better track which voters have already
cast ballots.99 When networked, e-pollbooks allow polling places to send and
receive real-time updates to voter registration data, which is critical for states
that use same-day registration.100 However, e-pollbooks are vulnerable to
cyberattacks that could change voter data, disrupt check-in procedures, and
manipulate information on who has and has not voted.101 Alternatively, a “denial
of service” attack could simply shut down operation of an e-pollbook, which
would altogether disrupt voting at a particular precinct.102
Currently no national security standards exist for e-pollbooks, and security
practices vary by state.103 The NAS recommends jurisdictions that use epollbooks have paper backup lists available to be used in the event of any

92

Manpearl, supra note 71, at 175.
NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 63.
94
SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 57 (noting that one state’s voter registration system
is more than ten years old).
95
NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 69.
96
Id. at 69–70.
97
Id. at 70.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 71.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 72.
103
Id. at 71.
93

MALEMPATI_12.2.20

2020]

12/2/2020 2:44 PM

THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE

431

disruption or compromise to the electronic version.104 The NAS also
recommends that Congress provide funds for the U.S. Election Assistance
Commission to develop national security standards for the use of e-pollbooks.105
Second, cybersecurity experts generally agree that cybersecurity risks are
inherent when states rely entirely on computers for voters to cast ballots.106
Currently, jurisdictions use a variety of types of ballots, including paper, card,
and machine-only, and votes are cast by a variety of mechanisms.107 In the
majority of jurisdictions, voters mark their choices on paper ballots, either by
hand or by using a ballot-marking device (BMD).108 Paper ballots are either
hand-counted or machine-counted, most commonly by optical scanners.109
Several states use direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines in at
least some jurisdictions.110 DREs are free-standing computer units that record
selections voters make using a touchscreen.111
States purchased DREs with funding from HAVA, which was passed as a
response to the problems with lever machines and punch card ballots in the 2000
presidential election.112 The advent of DREs introduced “new technical
challenges,” such as touchscreen miscalibration, which causes a voter’s intended
selection of one candidate to be misinterpreted as a vote for another candidate.113
Almost immediately, several security risks with DREs were identified, leading
some states to decertify and stop using the machines as early as 2007.114
Cybersecurity experts now recognize the full extent of the cybersecurity
risks with DREs. In its report on election security, the NAS noted that because
they are completely paperless, DREs create a risk that a cyberattack on the

104

Id. at 72.
Id.
106
Id. at 78.
107
Id. at 37, 39.
108
When voting with a BMD, a voter uses a touchscreen or keypad to mark his or her choices, after which
the BMD prints a paper copy of the selections. The paper printout is human-readable. The paper is then scanned
and tabulated by a separate device. With some BMD printouts, an optical scanner records and tallies the humanreadable ballot. With other BMDs, the actual selections are recorded on a barcode, which is then read by the
tabulating machine. Id. at 39.
109
Id. at 80.
110
Lawrence Norden & Andrea Cordova, Voting Machines at Risk: Where We Stand Today, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-machinesrisk-where-we-stand-today.
111
NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 78.
112
Zetter, supra note 29.
113
NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 78.
114
Zetter, supra note 29.
105
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machines will be undetectable.115 A computer virus could steal votes from one
candidate and assign them to another or could stop a machine from accepting
votes altogether.116 According to the Senate Intelligence Report, DRE voting
machines “can be programmed to show one result to the voter while recording a
different result in the tabulation.”117 Therefore, the report called for states to
discontinue using DREs, which “are now out of date.”118 A cybersecurity expert
actually demonstrated in a courtroom how a DRE machine could be infected
with malware that could alter vote counts on the machine.119 The same expert
showed that malware could be introduced remotely and be spread from machine
to machine.120
The Senate Intelligence Report concluded that “[p]aper ballots and optical
scanners are the least vulnerable to cyberattack.”121 Secure voting systems must
allow a voter to verify that the recorded ballot reflects his or her intent, which is
not possible with paperless DRE machines.122 Therefore, the NAS recommends
that “[w]ell designed, voter-marked paper ballots” be the standard way for voters
to cast their votes.123 The consensus opinion from national cybersecurity experts
is that an independent record of the voter’s physical ballot is essential as a
reliable audit tool.124 An auditable record can be achieved by using hand-marked
paper ballots.125 When voting machines are used to mark ballots, the machine
must provide a physical, human-readable record of the voter’s selections.126
National security experts also agree that the threat of foreign interference in
U.S. elections persists.127 In his testimony before Senate Intelligence
Committee, former Assistant Attorney General for National Security John
Carlin stated,
I’m very concerned about . . . our actual voting apparatus, and the
attendant structures around it . . . . We’ve literally seen it already, so
115

NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 78.
SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 42.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 59; see also Zetter, supra note 29 (noting that as early as 2007, some states have decertified
electronic voting machines after finding them to be susceptible to viruses and malicious software).
119
Curling v. Kemp, 334 F. Supp. 3d 1303, 1308 (N.D. Ga. 2018).
120
Id. at 1309. Accordingly, a federal judge in Georgia ordered a permanent injunction against the use of
DRE machines in the state after 2019. See infra Part III.C.
121
SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 59.
122
NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 79.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 79–80.
125
Id. at 42.
126
Id. at 78.
127
SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 43.
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shame on us if we can’t fix it heading into the next election cycles.
And it’s the assessment of every key intel professional, which I share,
that Russia’s going to do it again because they think it was successful.
So we’re in a bit of a race against time heading up to the two-year
election. Some of the election machinery that’s in place should not
be.128

Consequently, “[g]iven Russian intentions to undermine the credibility of the
election process, states should take urgent steps to replace outdated and
vulnerable voting systems.”129
C. States Responded Inadequately and Ineffectively to Russian Cyberattacks
In the summer of 2016, after it became clear to the Intelligence Community
that foreign actors were attacking state election infrastructure, intelligence
officials began the process of reaching out to states to offer cybersecurity
support.130 During a call with state election officials on August 15, 2016, DHS
Secretary Jeh Johnson offered to provide help to states by inspecting voting
systems for viruses and other signs of cyber invasion.131 DHS proposed
conducting on-site risk and vulnerability assessments as well as remote “cyber
hygiene scans” on internet-connected election management systems such as
voter registration databases.132 Several states rejected the offer for help.
According to Secretary Johnson, the general response from state officials was
“[t]his is our responsibility and there should not be a federal takeover of the
election system.”133 Then-Georgia Secretary of State Brian Kemp cited concerns
about “federal overreach” and claimed that help from federal intelligence
agencies would “subvert the [C]onstitution to achieve the goal of federalizing
elections under the guise of security.”134 Similarly, Louisiana Secretary of State
Tom Schedler chided Congress for overemphasizing the extent of the risk and
stated that election administration should be left to the states because “[t]hat’s

128
Id. (quoting Interview by Senate Select Comm. on Intel. with John Carlin, Former Assistant Att’y Gen.
for Nat’l Sec. (Sept. 25, 2017)).
129
Id. at 58.
130
Id. at 46–47.
131
Id. at 47–48; Aliya Sternstein, At Least One State Declines Offer for DHS Voting Security, NEXTGOV
(Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2016/08/some-swing-states-decline-dhs-votingsecurity-offer/131037/.
132
SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 52.
133
Id. at 47.
134
Sternstein, supra note 131.
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what the Constitution says.”135 Republican legislators also blocked funds for
election security in Minnesota and Arizona.136
Even more concerning, many states failed to recognize the extent or
seriousness of the threat and chose not to heed warnings from the Intelligence
Community.137 Several states also opposed the decision of Secretary Johnson to
designate U.S. election systems as critical infrastructure.138 DHS initially
intended to make the designation in August 2016 but held off until January 2017
because of pushback from state election officials.139 Again rejecting federal
support, the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) expressed
opposition to DHS’s critical infrastructure designation, mistakenly citing states’
primacy in regulating elections.140 The NASS stated that DHS “has no authority
to interfere with elections, even in the name of national security.”141 Secretary
Kemp declared that “[d]esignating voting systems or any other election system
as critical infrastructure would be a vast federal overreach.”142
Despite the dire warnings and offers to help from the Intelligence
Community, states did little to respond to the ongoing threat of cyberattacks on
election systems. Even after the breaches to databases in Illinois and Arizona
were known, states continued to struggle to respond to security risks.143 States
have displayed widely varying degrees of concern about election security and
efforts to address the security risks. For the most part, states relied on the same
insecure infrastructure to conduct elections in 2018 as they did in 2016, despite
the known risks.144 But the attacks on local elections systems did not subside
135
Aliya Sternstein, 9 States Accept DHS’s Election Security Support, NEXTGOV (Sept. 21, 2016),
https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2016/09/9-states-accept-dhss-election-security-support/131741/.
136
Gopal Ratnam, Democrats Target State Elections with Focus on Election Security, ROLL CALL (Aug.
22, 2019), https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/democrats-target-state-elections-focus-election-security.
137
See infra Part III.B.
138
Manpearl, supra note 71, at 186. The purpose of a critical infrastructure designation is to allow the
Federal Government to partner with and provide support to the identified sectors. The designation added U.S.
election systems to the other critical infrastructure sectors: chemical; commercial facilities; communications;
critical manufacturing; dams; defense industrial base; emergency services; energy; financial services; food and
agriculture; government facilities; health care and public health; information technology; nuclear reactors,
materials, and waste; transportation systems; and water and wastewater systems. Press Release, Off. of the Press
Sec’y, Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Feb. 12, 2013),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-criticalinfrastructure-security-and-resil.
139
SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 48–49.
140
Manpearl, supra note 71, at 187.
141
Nat’l Ass’n of Sec’ys of State, NASS Resolution Opposing the Designation of Elections as Critical
Infrastructure, at 21–22 (Feb. 18, 2017).
142
Sternstein, supra note 131.
143
SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 39; Norden & Cordova, supra note 110.
144
Wofford, supra note 55.
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after the 2016 election, and states continue to be ill-equipped to handle the
attacks.145
Georgia, for example, exhibited a grossly inadequate response to the
cybersecurity challenges that came to light in the 2016 election. The Georgia
Secretary of State’s Office left its registration database completely open to
hackers with 6.5 million voter records exposed during a six-month period in
2016–17.146 U.S. cybersecurity experts were able to access the database and even
plant files during that time.147 Malicious actors could have manipulated the data,
including dropping voters from the database or changing their data.148 But
Georgia election officials claimed they saw no evidence that any election related
data was compromised.149 However, a forensic evaluation was not done initially
because Georgia officials wiped the server that housed the data after the breach
was discovered.150 Evidence from an FBI image taken of the server before it was
wiped shows that there may have been signs of tampering.151
Georgia also knew of the substantial evidence that Russia was targeting
election systems and that its paperless, internet-connected voting system was
ripe for hacking.152 Yet, it made no significant changes, and in the 2018 federal
election, voters cast ballots on the same outdated, insecure system used in
2016.153 Georgia election officials were reluctant to acknowledge the full extent
of the vulnerability of Georgia’s electronic voting equipment even though
security flaws in DRE machines had been known for over a decade and Georgia
had not updated the software on its machines since 2005.154 Therefore, Georgia
voters used the same hackable and non-auditable voting machines in the 2018

145

Id.
NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 58.
147
Frank Bajak, Georgia Election Server Wiped After Suit Filed, PBS NEWSHOUR (Oct. 26, 2017, 9:34
AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/georgia-election-server-wiped-after-suit-filed.
148
NAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 57.
149
Frank Bajak, Georgia Election Server Showed Signs of Tampering, AP (Jan. 16, 2020), https://apnews.
com/39dad9d39a7533efe06e0774615a6d05.
150
Kim Zetter, Georgia Election Systems Could Have Been Hacked Before 2016 Vote, POLITICO (Jan. 16,
2020, 11:07 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/16/georgia-election-systems-could-have-beenhacked-before-2016-vote-100334.
151
Id.
152
See Curling v. Kemp, 334 F. Supp. 3d 1303, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (“[Georgia] stood by for far too
long, given the mounting tide of evidence of the inadequacy and security risks of Georgia’s DRE voting system
and software.”).
153
See Curling v. Raffensperger, 397 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1382–92 (N.D. Ga. 2019) (summarizing the
affidavits of 137 Georgia voters, 2 county pollworkers, and 15 pollwatchers, and concluding that the “same
pattern of problems with Georgia’s voting systems and registration databases has persisted across multiple
elections cycles”).
154
Id. at 1339, 1348.
146
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midterm elections.155 As a result, voters in Georgia experienced significant
difficulty voting in 2018.156 Problems reported by voters included long lines due
to malfunctioning machines being taken out of service, machines selecting the
wrong candidates when voters marked their choices on touchscreens, and checkin problems with e-pollbooks, including incorrect polling places or incorrect
addresses listed for voters.157 A federal court noted that Georgia state election
officials had “stood by for far too long” and “buried their heads in the sand”
rather than address the inadequacy and insecurity of Georgia’s voting system.158
Similarly, North Carolina refused an offer from the FBI to investigate
election irregularities in 2016.159 A forensic analysis was never conducted after
registered voters could not be located in local e-pollbook systems.160 Although
hacking was never proven as the cause of the e-pollbook discrepancy, it was
discovered that Russia targeted e-pollbook systems in several states, including
North Carolina.161 Despite knowing that information, county election officials
in North Carolina declined the FBI’s offer to investigate.162
Given that some states and municipalities have demonstrated they are
incapable and, in some instances, even unwilling to secure election
infrastructure, the United States needs a national election infrastructure plan.
Such a plan should follow the recommendations of national cybersecurity
experts to provide uniformity and address vulnerabilities in many state and local
election systems.
II. THE LANDSCAPE OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY OVER FEDERAL
ELECTIONS
Many state election officials, scholars, and federal legislators consider
primary authority over the conduct of federal elections to belong to the states.
For example, the first recommendation in the Senate Intelligence Report on
155
Id. at 1392; see Adam Levin & Beau Friedlander, Georgia’s Shaky Voting System, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/13/opinion/voting-machines-georgia-security.html (describing
how Georgia, for its 2018 gubernatorial election, relied on the same voting system it used in 2016 despite the
cybersecurity vulnerabilities that had been identified).
156
Mark Niesse, Long Lines and Equipment Problems Plague Election Day in Georgia, AJC (Nov. 6,
2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/long-lines-and-equipment-problems-plagueelection-day-georgia/l7NUidWbMetr5OFdGcb5ZM/.
157
Curling, 397 F. Supp. 3d at 1383.
158
Curling, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 1327.
159
Wofford, supra note 55.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
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Russian interference in the 2016 election is to “reinforce states’ primacy in
running elections.”163 The Supreme Court’s view on whether the federal
government or states have the ultimate right to prescribe the manner in which
federal elections are conducted has been unclear. The pendulum of the Court’s
interpretation of the differential authority between Congress and the states over
federal elections has swung back and forth for two centuries. From the
antebellum era to the Reconstruction Amendments to the VRA to the Court’s
decision in Shelby County, the Court has expanded and contracted congressional
authority relative to state sovereignty. But even this pendulum swing has
remained in a somewhat narrow range because Congress has never attempted to
exercise the full breadth of its authority under the Elections Clause.
The vast majority of congressional action to regulate elections since the Civil
War has been pursuant to the Reconstruction Amendments rather than the
Elections Clause.164 Even when congressional authority was at its peak under
the VRA, Congress approached election legislation from a deferential
framework. Congress only passed the VRA after the Civil Rights Movement’s
expansive and concerted fight for voting rights in the South brought national
attention and shifted public opinion on this issue.165 The Supreme Court upheld
this action by Congress under the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth
Amendment because of the long-standing and pernicious evil of racial
discrimination in voting.166 But Congress has yet to exercise and the Court has
yet to uphold the full extent of Congress’s power to enact federal election
legislation under the Elections Clause, which extends beyond antidiscrimination.
A. Congressional Authority Under the Reconstruction Amendments and the
Voting Rights Act
The end of the Civil War and the Reconstruction era brought a new paradigm
to the balance of federal authority versus state autonomy. The Fourteenth
Amendment provided an avenue for Congress to ensure that each state did not
abridge or deny certain rights to its own citizens.167 The Fifteenth Amendment
163
164

SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 54.
Franita Tolson, The Spectrum of Congressional Authority Over Elections, 99 B.U. L. REV. 317, 341

(2019).
165
CAROL ANDERSON, ONE PERSON, NO VOTE: HOW VOTER SUPPRESSION IS DESTROYING OUR
DEMOCRACY 21–22 (2018); see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 303 U.S. 301, 315 (1966) (“The burden is too
heavy—the wrong to citizens is too serious—the damage to our national conscience too great not to adopt more
effective measures than exist today.”).
166
Id. at 303–04.
167
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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prohibited states from denying the right to vote “on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.”168 Despite the Fifteenth Amendment
guarantee, many former Confederate states still prevented African American
citizens from exercising their new constitutional right to vote.169 But embedded
in the Reconstruction Amendments were enforcement provisions that
established a role for Congress to protect the rights of all citizens against state
action.170 The constitutional enfranchisement of African American voters
created a new framework for Congress to play a greater role in elections in order
to protect the right to vote.
While Congress had the power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments
to prevent states from infringing on their citizens’ right to vote, the
Reconstruction-era framework preserved a concept of federalism and state
sovereignty over the conduct of elections.171 Congress attempted to exert broad
authority to regulate elections through the Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871,
which instituted a system of federal oversight for congressional elections.172
However, despite Congress’s greater power to protect voters under the
Reconstruction Amendments, the Supreme Court did not allow Congress full
license to regulate elections. In United States v. Reese, the Court struck down
provisions of the Enforcement Act of 1870 because they exceeded the scope of
Congress’s mandate under the Fifteenth Amendment.173 The Court held that
section 4 of the statute was invalid because it created criminal penalties for state
officials who denied citizens the right to vote.174 According to the Court, the
Fifteenth Amendment did not confer upon Congress expansive power to regulate
elections and protect voters, but simply prevented states from discriminating
based on race.175
Similarly, the Court restrained Congress from using the Enforcement Act of
1870 to assert broad authority over states pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment
in United States v. Cruikshank.176 In that case, election inspectors in Louisiana
were criminally charged with conspiring to prevent two African American

168

U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
ANDERSON, supra note 165, at 2.
170
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
171
Tolson, supra note 164, at 354.
172
Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433; Tolson,
supra note 164, at 358.
173
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220 (1875).
174
Id. at 217–18, 220.
175
Id. at 217.
176
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875).
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citizens from exercising their right to vote.177 The Court dismissed the
indictments, holding that the Louisiana officials did not intentionally
discriminate based on race.178 Importantly, the Court noted that the federal
government had authority to prohibit discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment, but the right to vote itself came from the states.179 The Court,
however, did not address Congress’s power to regulate elections and ensure the
right to vote under the Elections Clause.
The post-Reconstruction era, beginning with the federal government’s
withdrawal of military troops in 1876, allowed Southern states to construct
significant structural barriers to African American suffrage.180 Discriminatory
devices to prevent African Americans from voting were enacted into state laws
and even embedded into the constitutions of several former Confederate
states.181 In addition to literacy tests, poll taxes, and good-morals requirements,
the small percentage of African Americans who were able to cast ballots in the
South often had to overcome outright violence.182
During the Jim Crow era of renewed disenfranchisement, the Supreme Court
invalidated several state laws designed to prevent African Americans from
voting as violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment.183 However,
case-by-case litigation was essentially a game of whack-a-mole. Each time
federal courts struck down a discriminatory state law that restricted the right of
its citizens to vote, states found insidious, creative alternative ways to
disenfranchise African American voters.184 For example, after two Supreme
Court decisions invalidated all-white primary elections, states such as South
Carolina and Texas found ways to unofficially hold “pre-primaries” without
such laws being on their books.185 The Civil Rights Movement forced Congress

177

Id. at 544–45.
Id. at 556–57.
179
Id. at 554–56 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment only confers on Congress the power to ensure
that states do not deny the equality of rights of their citizens, but states still assume the primary duty to guarantee
these rights: “The power of the national government is limited to the enforcement of this guaranty.”).
180
ANDERSON, supra note 165, at 2–3.
181
Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters, 48
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 733–43 (1998).
182
ANDERSON, supra note 165, at 14–18.
183
See, e.g., Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933, 933 (1949) (striking down, as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, a provision of the Alabama state constitution that required citizens to understand and explain
an article of the U.S. Constitution in order to exercise the right to vote).
184
ANDERSON, supra note 165, at 13.
185
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 656–57 (1944); ANDERSON, supra note 165, at 13.
178
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to enact a comprehensive plan to “banish the blight of racial discrimination in
voting.”186
Nearly a century after the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were
ratified, Congress responded to the grassroots efforts of the Civil Rights
Movement by passing the Voting Rights Act of 1965.187 The VRA prescribed
remedies for voting discrimination that it imposed on particular states that were
known to have constructed the greatest barriers for African American voters.188
By exercising its power under the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth
Amendment, Congress supplanted the right of states to enact particular
discriminatory voter qualification laws.189 The VRA placed significant
constraints on states’ autonomy in determining voter qualifications.190 Section 5
of the VRA required states or counties that had a history of discriminating
against African American voters, as defined in section 4(b), to submit to
preclearance by the U.S. Attorney General of any new law that impacted voter
qualifications or registration.191 The Act also authorized federal examiners to
directly place and remove voters from the registration lists of states and localities
who fell under the VRA’s coverage formula.192
When the Supreme Court upheld the VRA as “an appropriate means for
carrying out Congress’ constitutional responsibility,” federal authority to
regulate elections under the Reconstruction Amendments was at its zenith.193
South Carolina challenged the VRA on the grounds it exceeded Congress’s
powers and infringed on a function that had traditionally been left to states.194
But the Court dismissed these concerns.195 The Court held that “[a]s against the
reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate
the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”196 The Court in
186

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966); ANDERSON, supra note 165, at 21–22.
The Voting Rights Act was signed into law by President Lyndon Johnson on August 6, 1965. See
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 1–19, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 52 U.S.C.); see Eric S. Lynch, Trusting the Federalism Process Under Unique Circumstances: United States
Election Administration and Cybersecurity, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1979, 1991–92 (2019) (noting that
President Johnson introduced the voting rights bill to Congress three days after the “Bloody Sunday” Selma-toMontgomery march).
188
§§ 1–7, 79 Stat. at 437–41.
189
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (“Congress shall have the power to enforce this provision through
appropriate legislation.”); §§ 1–2, 79 Stat. at 437.
190
§§ 1–6, 79 Stat. at 437–40.
191
§§ 4(b)–5, 79 Stat. at 438–39.
192
§ 7, 79 Stat. at 440–41.
193
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 303 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
194
Id. at 323.
195
Id.
196
Id. at 324.
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South Carolina v. Katzenbach stated that Congress’s authority relative to states’
rights under the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment is just as broad
as Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.197 Therefore, to
prevent racial discrimination, the Supreme Court established that Congress had
paramount authority to supersede state autonomy in determining who was
eligible to cast a ballot.
According to the Court, “[t]he Voting Rights Act was designed by Congress
to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the
electoral process.”198 The Court emphasized the “unique circumstances” that
permitted Congress to exert such expansive powers to violate state sovereignty
under the Fifteenth Amendment.199 The unique circumstances to which the
Court referred were the overt discriminatory actions of several former slave
states that violated the Fifteenth Amendment.200 In Katzenbach, the Court’s
ratification of Congress’s power to enact the VRA was specific to the era as well
as the manner and degree to which the infringement on the rights of African
Americans were being infringed.201
Over the next almost fifty years, the Supreme Court continued to uphold the
VRA as a legitimate exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment.202 The Court recognized Congress’s authority to invalidate
provisions that did not have a stated discriminatory purpose but had a disparate
impact on the right of African Americans to vote. In City of Rome v. United
States, the Court upheld the VRA’s ban on changes to a municipality’s voting
provisions that would have had a discriminatory effect.203 In that case, the city
of Rome, Georgia challenged the VRA on federalism grounds.204 But the Court
made clear that the mandate embedded in the enforcement provisions of the
Reconstruction Amendments trumped federalism concerns.205 The Court stated
that “principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to
197
Id. at 325–26; see Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345–46 (1879) (“Whatever Legislation is
appropriate, that is, adapted to . . . secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the
equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of
congressional power.”) (emphasis added).
198
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308.
199
Id. at 335 (“Under the compulsion of these unique circumstances, Congress responded in a permissibly
decisive manner.”).
200
Id.
201
Id. at 326–31.
202
See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 287 (1999); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156, 173 (1980).
203
City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 173.
204
Id. at 178.
205
Id. at 179.
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congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the
Civil War Amendments ‘by appropriate legislation.’”206 The Court held that
Congress has the power to impose voting regulations on states and their political
subdivisions because the “[Reconstruction] Amendments were specifically
designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state
sovereignty.”207
The Supreme Court took its view of federal power over state regulations
under the Fifteenth Amendment one step further in Lopez v. Monterey County.208
In that case, Monterey County was subject to the coverage formula under section
4(b) of the VRA, but the State of California as a whole was not.209 California
passed a state law that determined the manner in which county judges were to
be elected.210 Voters alleged that the law was invalid as applied to Monterey
County because any changes to existing law that applied to the county had to be
precleared by the federal government.211 The Court determined that the
California law could not take effect in Monterey County until it received
preclearance pursuant to section 5 of the VRA.212 Therefore, the Court
recognized that Congress’s authority to enforce the Reconstruction
Amendments includes the power to supersede the rights of states to regulate their
own counties. Accordingly, at end of the twentieth century, Congress had broad
authority under the Fifteenth Amendment to regulate federal elections through
the VRA.
B. The Demise of the Voting Rights Act and the Shifting State-Federal
Authority to Regulate Elections
The twenty-first century brought a dramatic shift in the Supreme Court’s
deference to Congress to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment through the VRA,
which culminated in the Court’s gutting of the VRA in Shelby County v.
Holder.213 Chief Justice John Roberts’s general ideology appears to limit
congressional power in favor of state sovereignty through principles of
federalism.214 Relying on federalism, the Roberts Court has limited Congress’s
206

Id. (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)).
Id. at 179–80.
208
Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 287 (1999).
209
Id. at 269.
210
Id.
211
Id. at 271, 274.
212
Id. at 287.
213
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013).
214
Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)Trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 553, 580 (2015); see
Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (demonstrating
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ability to oversee elections and has elevated the role of states in regulating
various aspects of the voting process and election conduct.215 In sharp contrast
to the Civil Rights era that led to the VRA, the Court in recent years has more
closely scrutinized Congressional regulation of voting and elections while
affording more deference to election laws enacted by states.216
In 2009, the Court foreshadowed its holding in Shelby County by expressing
outright hostility to the VRA in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District
Number One v. Holder.217 In that case, a Texas municipal district challenged the
VRA’s preclearance requirement.218 The Court avoided the question of the
VRA’s constitutionality by resolving the district’s claims on statutory
grounds.219 In dicta, however, the Court raised concerns about whether the VRA
was constitutional.220 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts noted that
section 5 of the VRA “authorizes federal intrusion into . . . state and local
policymaking” and “imposes substantial ‘federalism costs.’”221 The Court also
stated that section 5 exceeded Congress’s mandate under the Fifteenth
Amendment by suspending all changes to election law in the jurisdictions falling
under its coverage formula.222 In the concluding paragraphs of the opinion,
which foreshadowed Shelby County, the Court claimed that the “exceptional
conditions” that justified the VRA no longer exist as “we are now a very
different Nation.”223
Four years later, in Shelby County, the Supreme Court struck down section
4(b) of the VRA.224 Section 4(b) had delineated the “coverage” formula that
determined which states and localities were subject to federal preclearance
before enacting new voting legislation.225 In invalidating portions of the VRA,
the Court described its rationale as a combination of federalism issues, concerns

that judicial ideology impacts judicial decisions regarding voting rights).
215
Douglas, supra note 214, at 583.
216
Id. at 579; see Franita Tolson, Election Law “Federalism” and the Limits of the Anti-Discrimination
Framework, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2211, 2215 (2018) (arguing that recent case law has limited the extent of
Congress’s powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments due to federalism concerns and the Supreme
Court now views states as having broad authority to regulate federal elections).
217
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009).
218
Id. at 196.
219
Id. at 205–06.
220
Id. at 204.
221
Id. at 202 (quoting Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)).
222
Id.
223
Id. at 211.
224
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013).
225
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(b), 79 Stat. 437, 438 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
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about equal sovereignty among states, and changed conditions regarding racial
inequality in voting.226 A concern for state sovereignty predominated Justice
Roberts’s majority opinion.227 The Court described the VRA’s requirement that
certain states obtain federal permission before enacting voting laws as “a drastic
departure from basic principles of federalism.”228
Scholars and interested parties soon discovered that the Shelby County
decision definitively altered the Court’s view of the balance between state and
federal government in regulating elections under the Reconstruction
Amendments.229 Prior to Shelby County, the Court had generally recognized
Congress’s authority to supersede state laws regulating elections in order to
protect voters’ rights.230 Shelby County turned that assumption on its head.
Contrary to the prior understanding of the federal-state balance regarding
elections, the Court stated that the original intent of the framers was for states to
have primary authority to regulate federal elections.231 The Court in Shelby
County held that the VRA was only a legitimate exercise of Congress’s power
when it was enacted because it was the product of a particular time in history.232
However, the Court’s emphasis in Shelby County on federalism and state
sovereignty in conducting elections was misguided. The Court viewed the
authority to regulate elections solely from an antidiscrimination perspective and,
ignoring its City of Rome precedent, focused on overt discriminatory intent.233
By only evaluating Congress’s power to protect the rights of minority voters
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the Court discounted
Congress’s broad powers to contradict state laws and regulate elections under
the Elections Clause.
C. The Elections Clause Grants Congress Broad Authority to Regulate
Federal Elections
Congress’s authority to regulate federal elections under the Elections Clause
226

Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 534–44, 547.
Id. at 535 (stating that the VRA infringed on state sovereignty and section 4 violated “the principle that
all states enjoy equal sovereignty”).
228
Id.
229
See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 1, at 488, 522 (presenting the case against an “optimistic”
reading of the Shelby County holding for voting rights advocates).
230
Id. at 500–01, 516.
231
Id. at 517.
232
Id. at 495 (noting that Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion stated that the VRA was only acceptable
in 1966 because “exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate” (quoting
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 303 U.S. 301, 334 (1966))).
233
See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 551, 553, 556.
227
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is significantly broader than the Court has acknowledged since Shelby County.234
In Federalist 59, Alexander Hamilton explained that the Elections Clause
invested ultimate authority to regulate federal elections in “the national
legislature.”235 Because of the clear mandate of the Elections Clause, the
Supreme Court was remiss in Shelby County to overvalue state sovereignty in
regard to the conduct of federal elections.236 The Court mistakenly relied on
what it called a “prevailing view that federalism best explains” the U.S. election
system.237
1. Decentralization Versus Federalism
The Elections Clause precludes viewing the balance of state-versus-federal
authority to regulate elections through traditional notions of federalism.238 The
text and history of the Elections Clause demonstrate that the Constitution
prescribed a system for federal elections based on decentralization rather than
federalism.239 Though often conflated, “federalism” and “decentralization” are
distinct concepts.240 Decentralization is a hierarchically organized “managerial
concept” in which the leader at the top has plenary power over the subordinate
units.241 Federalism may be structurally similar to decentralization.242 But as a
political concept, federalism implies that the subordinate units retain certain
rights and “areas of jurisdiction that cannot be invaded by the central
authority[.]”243 In the United States, federalism denotes separate sovereignty and
a “system of parallel federal and state governance.”244
Regarding federal elections, the Elections Clause prescribes a system of
decentralization rather than federalism.245 A traditional notion of federalism
does not bar Congress from enacting broad legislation to dictate the manner in
234

Tolson, supra note 216, at 2217.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton).
236
Tolson, supra note 216, at 2214.
237
Id. at 2216.
238
Id. at 2215–18; see Tolson, supra note 164, at 321–22.
239
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; see Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on
the Voting Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1247 (2012) (“The organizational structure of the [Elections]
Clause itself is not really federalist, but reflects a decentralized organizational structure that is often confused
with federalism.”); Weinstein-Tull, supra note 3, at 790 (noting that some scholars argue that federal election
statutes do not implicate federalism, but demonstrate a form of “managerial decentralization”).
240
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 903, 910–11 (1994).
241
Id.
242
Id. at 911.
243
Id.
244
Weinstein-Tull, supra note 3, at 775.
245
Tolson, supra note 239, at 1202, 1247.
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which federal elections will be conducted.246 In contrast, states have no plenary
power to regulate federal elections.247 States can administer federal elections
under direct grant from the Elections Clause but subject to Congress’s ultimate
authority.248 Pursuant to the Elections Clause, “the Constitution primarily treats
states as election administrators rather than sovereign entities.”249 Therefore,
states may only regulate federal elections in a managerial sense.250 Congress has
the final say in how authority is delegated and has generally left states “to fill
in . . . the blanks with respect to the nuts and bolts of federal elections[.]”251
2. Congress Has Used Its Election Clause Authority to a Limited Degree
In addition to exercising federal authority over elections under the Fifteenth
Amendment, Congress has, at times, used its Elections Clause power.252 Two
examples of statutes enacted under the Elections Clause that have been upheld
by courts are the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) and the Help
America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).253
Congress enacted the NVRA to increase voter participation in elections by
making voter registration easier for all eligible citizens.254 The NVRA requires
states to provide opportunities to register to vote when citizens interact with
various state government offices, such as applying for driver’s licenses or
applying for aid through public assistance and disability services offices.255 The
NVRA also authorizes the federal government to enforce its provisions through
civil actions against states.256
Federal courts have generally upheld the NVRA as a legitimate exercise of
Congress’s Elections Clause authority.257 Despite giving no weight to the
246
Tolson, supra note 216, at 2216 (“Congress and the courts can disregard state sovereignty in enacting,
enforcing, and resolving the constitutionality of legislation passed pursuant to the Elections Clause.”).
247
Michael T. Morley, The Intratextual Independent “Legislature” and the Elections Clause, 109 NW. U.
L. REV. 847, 849 (2015).
248
Id.
249
Harkless v. Bruner, 545 F. 3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2008).
250
See Tolson, supra note 239, at 1197.
251
Tolson, supra note 216, at 2218.
252
Franita Tolson, The Elections Clause and Underenforcement of Federal Law, 129 YALE L.J. F. 171,
173 (2019).
253
See Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, §§ 101–906, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21145); see National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, §§ 1–
13, 107 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511).
254
§ 2, 107 Stat. at 77.
255
§§ 4–5, 7, 107 Stat. at 78, 80–81.
256
§ 11, 107 Stat. at 88.
257
See Weinstein-Tull, supra note 3, at 762–63, 765.
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Elections Clause in Shelby County, the Supreme Court recognized Congress’s
broad power to regulate voter qualification standards under the Elections Clause
in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.258 In Inter Tribal Council, the
Court held that the NVRA preempted an Arizona state law.259 The Court noted
that the Elections Clause grants Congress final policymaking authority over
many aspects of federal elections.260 The NVRA required states to accept a
national mail registration form developed by the Federal Election
Commission.261 The Court held that the NVRA mandate that states “accept and
use” a federal form to register voters superseded Arizona’s law that required
voters to present proof of citizenship to register to vote.262
In some cases, courts have noted that Congress’s right to disregard states’
autonomy under the Elections Clause is even broader than its powers under the
Commerce Clause.263 For example, “[i]f Congress determines that the voting
requirements established by a state do not sufficiently protect the right to vote,
it may force the state to alter its regulations.”264 In ACORN v. Miller, the Sixth
Circuit rejected Michigan’s challenge to the NVRA.265 Michigan argued that
“Congress overstepped its power to regulate federal elections by compelling
state legislation to effectuate a federal program, directing states to legislate
toward a federal purpose, and forcing states to bear the financial burden of
enacting a federal scheme.”266 However, the Sixth Circuit held that, unlike the
Commerce Clause, the Elections Clause “specifically grants Congress the
authority to force states to alter their regulations regarding federal elections.”267
Congress’s power under the Elections Clause extends as far as
commandeering state offices and state election officials to carry out federal

258

Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 14–15 (2013).
Id. at 14–15, 20.
260
Id. at 8–9.
261
National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, § 6, 107 Stat. 77, 79–80 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511). When HAVA was enacted, this function of the Federal Election
Commission transferred to the Election Assistance Commission. See Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-252, § 303, 116 Stat. 1666, 1713–14 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21145).
262
Inter Tribal Council, 570 U.S. at 15.
263
See Harkless v. Bruner, 545 F. 3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[U]nlike the Commerce Clause . . . Article
I section 4 specifically grants Congress the authority to force states to alter their regulations regarding federal
elections.” (quoting ACORN v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 836 (6th Cir. 1997))). Congress’s power to prescribe the
details that state legislatures must adopt to hold federal elections stands in stark contrast to virtually all other
provisions of the Constitution. Id.
264
ACORN, 129 F.3d at 837.
265
Id. at 837–38.
266
Id. at 836.
267
Id.
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law.268 For example, the NVRA imposes duties on state officials: each state must
designate a particular state election official to be responsible for carrying out
state obligations under the Act.269 States have claimed that the NVRA violates
the anticommandeering doctrine because it forces them to enact new legislation
to administer a federal program.270
The anticommandeering doctrine prohibits the federal government from
compelling states to “implement, by legislation or executive action, federal
regulatory programs.”271 However, as it relates to commandeering, courts have
distinguished the source of congressional power in upholding federal election
legislation.272 The prohibition on commandeering under Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority does not extend to Congress’s authority under the Elections
Clause.273 In contrast to the Commerce Clause, the Elections Clause allows
Congress to “conscript state agencies” to administer a federal election
scheme.274 Therefore, under the Elections Clause, Congress may “enact election
legislation that forces a state to take action it might not otherwise take, without
violating the anticommandeering doctrine.”275 Despite this mandate, Congress
has been reluctant to use the full extent of its Elections Clause authority because
of “federalism” concerns.276
Congress passed HAVA in response to the challenges encountered in the
2000 presidential election.277 That election was plagued by unreliable voting
systems that varied by jurisdiction, culminating in the “hanging chad” debacle
in Florida.278 HAVA provided federal funds for states to update their voting
machines while placing several requirements on states.279 HAVA’s mandatory
provisions include allowing voters to review and verify votes before casting a
268
Tolson, supra note 216, at 2220 (noting that Congress’s primacy in regulating elections is embodied
by “its independent authority to make legislation, alter state law, and commandeer state officials to implement
federal law”).
269
National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, § 10, 107 Stat. 77, 87 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511)
270
Voting Rts. Coal. v. Wilson 60 F.3d 1411, 1415–16 (9th Cir. 1995); see ACORN v. Edgar, 56 F.3d
791, 793 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing an argument by the state of Illinois that the NVRA would require it to
change its state laws that govern voter registration).
271
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997).
272
Weinstein-Tull, supra note 3, at 782.
273
Id.
274
Voting Rts. Coal., 60 F.3d at 1415.
275
Weinstein-Tull, supra note 3, at 782.
276
See infra Part III.A.
277
Weinstein-Tull, supra note 3, at 757.
278
Id.
279
Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, §§ 102, 301, 303, 116 Stat. 1666, 1670–71,
1704–05, 1708 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21145).
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ballot, making voting accessible to people with disabilities, and centralizing
voter registration databases at the state level.280 But HAVA did not “fully
nationalize election administration.”281 Even after HAVA, states and
municipalities remain relatively autonomous in conducting elections.282
With HAVA, Congress used a carrot as much as a stick to coax states into
making voting more secure and accessible.283 HAVA required states to update
voting machines and provided funds for the upgrades, but left states to determine
which systems to use.284 HAVA requires that elections be auditable, but stops
short of requiring paper ballots.285 In March 2018, the U.S. Election Assistance
Commission announced that it would provide $380 million in election security
grants to states, but it left states with discretion in how to use the funds.286 Under
the Elections Clause, Congress has much more authority than it exercised with
HAVA. Congress can create a national plan for elections and force states to
comply with and administer the plan.287
Thus, unlike the antidiscrimination framework of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, Congress is not constrained by federalism when it exerts
its authority under the Elections Clause.288 Courts can and should disregard
claims of state sovereignty in resolving the constitutionality of legislation passed
pursuant to the Elections Clause.289 But Congress has exercised its Elections
Clause power far less often than it has used its authority to enforce the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.290 Because the Supreme Court’s
decision in Shelby County diminished Congress’s power to regulate elections
under the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress must rely on its Elections
Clause authority to enact legislation that protects U.S. election infrastructure.291
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§§ 301, 303, 116 Stat. at 1704–05, 1708.
Weinstein-Tull, supra note 3, at 759.
282
Id.
283
Cf. JAMES T. BENNET, MANDATE MADNESS: HOW CONGRESS FORCES STATES AND LOCALITIES TO DO
ITS BIDDING 211, 214–15 (2014) (describing and criticizing the “carrot and stick” approach of HAVA, which
provided federal funds to help induce states to comply with the statute’s requirement that they update and
modernize voting equipment).
284
§§ 102–305, 116 Stat. at 1670–71, 1714.
285
§§ 301, 116 Stat. at 1704–06.
286
U.S. Election Assistance Commission to Administer $380 Million in 2018 HAVA Election Security
Funds, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N NEWS (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.eac.gov/news/2018/03/29/uselection-assistance-commission-to-administer-380-million-in-2018-hava-election-security-funds.
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See infra Part III.A.
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Tolson, supra note 252, at 173.
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While Congress has not previously exercised the full extent of its power under
the Elections Clause, it could do so to create a uniform federal election system.
III. CONGRESS SHOULD ACT TO PROTECT U.S. ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE
Due to the threat of foreign interference in U.S. elections, Congress has both
the authority and an obligation to act. The notion that Congress cannot create a
federal plan for elections because such action would infringe on states’ rights
misinterprets the Constitution. The Elections Clause gives Congress a definitive
right to regulate federal elections.292 The combination of multiple sources of
constitutional authority—the Elections Clause and the Reconstruction
Amendments—provides Congress with even greater power to act.293 Congress
is also duty-bound to protect the integrity of our democracy and to ensure the
rights of all citizens to have their votes properly counted.294 It has a
responsibility to take action to protect U.S. election infrastructure in the face of
cybersecurity threats because state and local election officials are incapable of
doing so.295
Therefore, to combat foreign interference, Congress must enact legislation
to improve the security of election systems throughout the country. Congress
should pass a federal plan for three main reasons. First, the structure and purpose
the Elections Clause bestows upon Congress a duty to maintain the legitimacy
of the federal government.296 In other words, Congress must ensure that the
result of federal elections reflects the will of voters. Second, states are illequipped and reticent to take the cybersecurity measures necessary to protect
election infrastructure.297 Third, the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments obligate Congress to protect the right of all citizens to
vote.298
A. Congress Has an Obligation Under the Elections Clause to Protect U.S.
Democracy
The integrity of elections is critical to maintaining democracy in the United
States. Almost 150 years ago, the Supreme Court analogized the power to
292

See supra Part II.C.
Tolson, supra note 164; see infra Part III.C.
294
See United States v. Slone, 411 F.3d 643, 649 (2005) (“Under the Elections Clause, Congress is
authorized to protect the integrity of federal elections.”).
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See infra Part III.B.
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See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; Tolson, supra note 216, at 2218.
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regulate federal elections to the right to defend the nation itself.299 In Ex parte
Yarbrough, the Court stated “[t]hat a government whose essential character is
republican . . . has no power by appropriate laws to secure this election from the
influence of violence, of corruption, and of fraud, is a proposition so startling as
to arrest consideration and demand the gravest consideration.”300 Foreign
interference in U.S. elections is not a necessary, but a sufficient, condition for
Congress to exercise its authority under the Elections Clause. Congress has a
constitutional responsibility to ensure the integrity of the U.S. election process
and to protect the fundamental right of citizens to vote.
The overarching purpose of the Elections Clause “is to ensure the continued
existence and legitimacy of federal elections.”301 Hamilton described the critical
point of the Elections Clause: “every government ought to contain in itself the
means of its own preservation.”302 According to Hamilton, Congress must use
its authority to assume from states the responsibility of regulating the manner of
federal elections “whenever extraordinary circumstances might render that
imposition necessary to its safety.”303 Foreign interference in U.S. elections is
one such extraordinary circumstance.304 Therefore, for the safety of the nation
and the preservation of confidence in federal elections, Congress has an
obligation to invoke the Elections Clause to create a federal plan for election
administration.305
While Congress has occasionally exercised its broad powers to regulate
elections under the Elections Clause, it has been reluctant to take full action
against the threat of foreign interference. In response to Russia’s cyberattacks in
2016 and 2018, the Democratic-led House of Representatives attempted to take
small steps to improve the security of federal elections. In 2018, Congress
authorized $380 million under HAVA for states to bolster their election
security.306 While several states used the HAVA funds to strengthen
cybersecurity and purchase new voting equipment, the amount of money is far
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from sufficient.307 Congress has otherwise been reluctant to pass legislation that
would be effective enough to prevent further cyberattacks.308
Although the House passed three election security bills in 2019,
predominantly along party-line votes, the bills have made no progress in the
Senate.309 Congressional Republicans have downplayed the extent of foreign
interference in the 2016 and 2018 elections.310 Objecting to the 2019 Securing
America’s Federal Elections (SAFE) Act, Representative Rodney Davis (R-Ill.)
stated that Congress should not force states to update voting technology because
“there is no evidence of voting machines being hacked in 2016, 2018[,] or
ever[.]”311 Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), who has refused
to bring any of the House bills up for a vote in the Senate, has also minimized
the risk.312 Senator McConnell even chided the media for fostering panic among
voters and for not giving more credit to the current administration for preventing
major security breaches in the 2018 election.313
However, in objecting to the SAFE act, Congressional Republicans have
primarily argued that the bill’s provisions interfere with the authority of states
and localities to conduct elections.314 Senator McConnell stated that while he
believes Russian meddling to be real, he doesn’t believe that the federal
government should tell states how to run elections.315
The Republican sentiment, as expressed by Senator McConnell,
misinterprets the authority granted to Congress under the Constitution. Because
the Elections Clause gives Congress final policymaking authority over the times,
places, and manners of federal elections, it “allows Congress to legislate
independent of and without deference to state sovereignty.”316 Therefore, the
307
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notion that Congress must cajole states to undertake security fixes to their
election systems and abide by federal security standards is grossly misguided.317
Congress has an obligation under the Elections Clause to preserve the legitimacy
of the federal government by ensuring that federal elections reflect the will of
the people.318 A strong and uniform federal plan is needed to protect against
efforts by foreign actors to disrupt U.S. elections.
B. Congress Has a Duty to Secure U.S. Elections Against Foreign
Interference Because States Are Ill-Equipped and Reluctant to Do So
The United States is unique in that it currently has no nationwide election
authority.319 Conducting elections in the United States is a complex process “that
involves multiple levels of government, personnel with a variety of skills and
capabilities, and numerous electronic systems that interact in the performance of
a multitude of tasks.”320 State or local officials manage elections in accordance
with state laws and local regulations.321 Elections are administered by over 9,000
state and local jurisdictions containing over 114,000 polling places.322 The
thousands of jurisdictions vary widely in size, in funding available for election
administration, and in the ability to detect and manage irregularities, particularly
cyberattacks.323 Several of the small elections offices “have few dedicated staff
and little access to the latest information technology (IT) training or tools.”324
A lack of cyber sophistication was evident in the 2016 election as states and
municipalities were unequipped to deal with the severity of the threat. One state
official said, “I don’t think any of us expected to be hacked by a foreign
government.”325 Another official stated, “If a nation-state is on the other side,
it’s not a fair fight. You have to phone a friend.”326 In most states, the
decentralized structure means that counties and municipalities have varying

317
See SENATE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 54 (stating in its recommendations that “[s]tates
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levels of resources to conduct elections.327 County election officials, who are on
the front lines of defending election equipment, often have very limited IT
support.328 A Wisconsin state election administrator noted that some counties’
election teams may only consist of “a county clerk and one more person working
on elections.”329
Many county officials have not received any cybersecurity training, even
after the 2016 cyberattacks were made known. In Pennsylvania, election
officials in three of the four largest counties had not received cybersecurity
training as of August 2017.330 In Michigan, officials in fewer than one-third of
counties indicated that they received formal cybersecurity training.331 And in
Arizona, officials in only five of fifteen counties received such training.332
States also vary widely in the level of security they maintain around voter
registration databases. DHS analysis of state election systems found significant
variance in the security of state voter registration databases, including lack of
encryption and lack of backups in many states.333 As of May 2017, forty-one
states were still using voter registration systems that were created more than a
decade prior.334 Types of vote casting systems also vary dramatically from state
to state. Forty-five states continue to use outdated voting machines that are no
longer manufactured.335 Some machines are at least fifteen years old and run on
outdated software that is no longer supported, such as Windows XP.336 In the
November 2018 election, fourteen states did not use a voting mechanism that
allowed for a voter-verified paper audit trail.337
Many states understand the need for more secure voting equipment but lack
sufficient financial resources. Although the 2018 HAVA funds were dispersed
quickly, states did not have enough time to make major improvements to their
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election systems before the 2018 midterm elections.338 The funding has also
been insufficient for states to overhaul their elections systems and replace
outdated voting machines.339 Most states recognized a need to purchase new
equipment before the 2020 election, but two thirds of the state officials claimed
that they lack the money to do so, even with the additional HAVA funds.340
Consequently, states and municipalities cannot be relied on to successfully
combat foreign cyberattacks against U.S. election systems. According to Senator
Ron Wyden (D-Or.),
If there was ever a moment when Congress needed to exercise its clear
constitutional authorities, this is it. America is facing a direct assault
on the heart of our democracy by a determined adversary. We would
not ask a local sheriff to go to war against the missiles, planes and
tanks of the Russian army. We shouldn’t ask a county IT employee to
fight a war against the full capabilities and vast resources of Russia’s
cyber army. That approach failed in 2016 and it will fail again.341

Simply providing funding to states is also not enough. Congress must create a
comprehensive plan to secure federal elections against foreign attacks.
C. Congress Must Enact a Federal Plan to Preserve the Right of All Citizens
to Vote
Professor Franita Tolson has effectively described how Congress’s license
to enact comprehensive federal election legislation may be even greater than its
Elections Clause power alone because it derives from multiple sources of
authority.342 In addition to its obligation to preserve the integrity of federal
elections under the Elections Clause, Congress has a responsibility to exercise
its authority under the enforcement clauses of Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to protect the right of all citizens to vote.343 Multiple sources of
authority confer even broader power when Congress acts to protect
constitutional rights and may provide the impetus for the Supreme Court to find
a federal statute valid where it would have considered it unconstitutional under
a single source of authority.344 Therefore, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s
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holding in Shelby County, the Reconstruction Amendments provide additional
power to Congress’s Elections Clause authority to establish a federal system for
election infrastructure.345 With this power comes a duty for Congress to act.
Cyberattacks that disrupt the voting process and create risks that vote tallies
will be manipulated infringe on the right of citizens to vote. The fundamental
right to vote includes the right to be certain that one’s vote matters.346 Courts
have found that plaintiffs have standing to bring Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process and Equal Protection claims where they allege that certain voting
methods prohibit their votes from being properly counted.347 In Stewart v.
Blackwell, the Sixth Circuit found that the increased probability that plaintiffs’
votes would not be properly counted due to a faulty punch-card system was
“neither speculative nor remote” and was therefore a justiciable claim.348
Similarly, a Pennsylvania court found that voters had proper standing to bring a
Fourteenth Amendment claim because the machines they used to vote did not
allow them to know whether their votes had been cast or would be counted.349
A recent lawsuit brought by voters in Georgia demonstrates how voting
systems that are not secure against cyberattacks infringe on voters’ rights.350 A
federal court granted an injunction against using insecure DRE machines based
on the merits of the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal
Protection claims.351 The plaintiffs in Curling claimed that the state had violated
their Due Process rights by placing a “substantial burden” on their fundamental
right to vote and had violated their Equal Protection rights by placing “more
severe burdens” on their right to vote than voters who did not have to use DRE
machines.352 The court agreed and granted plaintiff’s relief in part because the

(2004) (upholding Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) based on “the power to enforce the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment and to regulate commerce”), with Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001)
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state’s ongoing use of an insecure voting method “pierce[d] citizens’ confidence
in the electoral system and the value of voting.”353
Therefore, in some instances, voting rights advocates can protect the right to
vote against insecure voting systems through litigation.354 Federal courts may be
willing to recognize that an infringement on voters’ right to feel secure that their
votes will count is an injury for which relief may be granted.355 Insecure voting
systems can also affect voters’ ability to merely cast a ballot. Long wait times to
vote—resulting from erroneous registration data or voting equipment
dysfunction—may impact minority voting districts to a greater degree than
predominantly white precincts.356 And as wait times increase, voter participation
drops.357 Consequently, the Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth
Amendment may be implicated when citizens of color are disproportionately
denied the right to vote when cyberattacks disrupt voting on election day.
However, litigation is cumbersome and cannot always protect the rights of
all voters or ensure the integrity of federal elections. Indeed, one impetus for the
VRA in 1965 was that piecemeal litigation had failed to sustainably protect the
African Americans’ right to vote in most jurisdictions in the Deep South.358 With
each hard fought victory in courts, state and local governments found ways to
enact new restrictions.359 Moreover, litigation only grants relief after harm has
occurred. Courts can grant prospective relief to require security measures for
future election cycles.360 But there is no sufficient remedy for the harm to voters
that has already occurred after they participated in an insecure election.361 Thus,
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the federal government must respond comprehensively to protect voters’ rights
against cyberattacks from foreign actors.
In sum, Congress must act to protect U.S. election infrastructure and to
combat foreign interference in federal elections. Congress has the primary
obligation to safeguard the legitimacy of the federal government, to protect the
fundamental right of citizens to vote, and to ensure that the election results
reflect the choice of the majority of voters. And Congress has the authority to
act pursuant to the Elections Clause coupled with the enforcement provisions of
the Reconstruction Amendments, which provide additional power to protect the
right of all citizens to vote.
IV. A PROPOSED FEDERAL PLAN TO SECURE U.S. ELECTIONS
Congress has the power under the Elections Clause to enact legislation that
establishes a federal plan to which state election authorities must adhere.362 The
Elections Clause authorizes Congress to designate the manner in which federal
elections are conducted in order to protect the integrity of the federal government
against a threat of foreign interference.363 After Russian cyberattacks against
state and local election systems in 2016 and 2018, and the anemic, ineffective
response by state election officials, the need for a uniform federal election plan
is evident.364 Therefore, Congress has the obligation to enact a national plan that
creates uniform standards across all election jurisdictions to ensure that federal
elections are secure and that all citizens are able to exercise their right to vote
and know their votes will count.
A national plan for federal elections does not imply that the entirety of
election administration should be conducted by the federal government. The
decentralized approach to U.S. elections, which relies on states and localities to
manage the nuts and bolts of elections, provides efficiency.365 The cybersecurity
benefit of a decentralized structure remains—it protects against the devastating
impact of a single widespread cyberattack or technological breakdown.366 But
an ongoing role for states to conduct elections does not preclude implementing
uniform rules and standards for federal elections. Measures to secure U.S.
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election infrastructure would be most effective if they are implemented at a
national level.367
Although Congress’s national plan for federal elections should be mandatory
for states to follow, the Elections Clause does not grant Congress authority over
state and local elections.368 However, Congress can encourage states to follow a
federal election plan for their own internal elections. First, because of logistics,
efficiency, and cost, states would likely use federal election infrastructure to
conduct state and local elections along with federal elections. Second, states’
inability to take appropriate cybersecurity measures for their own elections
provides the impetus for Congress to act under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to protect the right of all citizens to know that their votes with
count.369 Unlike the Elections Clause, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
apply to all elections: federal, state, and local.370 Third, Congress could use its
Spending Clause power to condition funding for election infrastructure on a
state’s compliance with a federal plan for all elections conducted within the
state.371
A national election plan should have three main components. First, it should
create uniform federal standards for securing voter registration databases and for
transmitting voter information to polling places so that voters can be checked-in
on election day. Second, Congress should require that all states implement a
secure method of voting that uses a uniform ballot design. All voters should be
allowed to mark and record their selections in the manner that is least susceptible
to cyberattacks: hand-marked paper ballots read by secure, state-of-the-art
optical scanners. Finally, to ensure the integrity of every federal election, states
must be required to submit to federal post-election audits.

367
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A. Congress Should Establish Binding Federal Standards for States to
Register Voters, Maintain Secure Voter Databases, and Check-in Voters at
the Polls
Voter registration databases that are maintained electronically are
particularly vulnerable to manipulation by malicious cyber actors.372 Election
administrators currently rely on county or state government IT departments to
secure voter registration databases.373 A DHS analysis found that the security of
voter databases varied significantly by state, and many states lacked encryption
and backups for their databases.374 Federal intelligence and cybersecurity
officials have made recommendations to states and have offered to provide
cybersecurity measures to protect voter registration databases.375 But many
states have demonstrated a reluctance to receive help from the federal
government or to follow recommendations.376
Consequently, Congress must pass legislation that directs states to
implement specific cybersecurity measures for voter registration databases,
which include updating relevant software, creating paper back-ups, and
instituting two-factor authentication for user access to the databases.377 This
action would not be novel—Congress has previously set mandatory
requirements for state voter databases.378 A federal plan should also require
states to put in place standard security procedures for monitoring voter database
integrity.379 Such measures should include installing monitoring sensors on state
registration systems to detect attempts to hack into the systems and reporting
any identified compromises immediately to DHS.380
A national plan must also create standards for transmitting voter data to
polling places for voter verification and check-in. Because they are electronic,
e-pollbooks are vulnerable to cyberattacks, particularly if they are locally
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networked or connected to the internet.381 Cyberattacks could change voter data,
alter information on who has voted, or simply shut down operation of an epollbook through a “denial of service” attack.382 Congress should, therefore,
include national security standards for the use of e-pollbooks in its federal plan.
Because e-pollbooks have advantages over paper and are easy to use, their use
should not be discontinued.383 Rather, the NAS recommends that Congress
authorize and fund the National Institute of Standards and Technology to
develop security standards along with verification and validation protocols for
e-pollbooks.384 In addition, each precinct should be required to maintain a paper
copy of the precinct’s pollbook as a back-up in the event that voter data is
manipulated or access to electronic data is disrupted.385
B. Congress Should Mandate Uniform Paper Ballots for All Federal Elections
Voters across the country cast their ballots using methods that are subject to
varying degrees of cyber risks, and many states are either unwilling or incapable
of following the recommendations of cybersecurity experts.386 Voting systems
that do not provide human-readable printouts for voters to confirm their
selections and do not maintain a voter-verified paper audit trail are most
vulnerable to cyberattacks.387 Experts have called for discontinuing the use of
paperless DRE machines because they are vulnerable to hacking without
detection and do not produce auditable paper trails.388 Yet, in 2019, twelve states
were still using paperless DRE machines in at least some jurisdictions, and four
states still used them statewide.389 Congress should pass legislation that prohibits
states from using outdated, paperless voting machines and requires the use of a
uniform method of voting that will provide an auditable paper trail.
The Senate Intelligence Report concluded that “[p]aper ballots and optical
scanners are the least vulnerable to cyberattack.”390 The most secure and costeffective method for voting would be to use hand-marked paper ballots in all
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federal elections.391 Using a uniform paper ballot for federal elections that voters
mark by hand would also allow states to continue and expand the use of voteby-mail.392 Alternatively, Congress could require and provide funding for
uniform BMD machines to be used across all jurisdictions. The BMDs must
produce a paper record of the voter’s choices, which each voter can review
before casting their ballot. However, because BMD machines are potentially
vulnerable to cyberattacks, the most secure election systems use hand-marked
paper ballots as the primary method for voting.393 Moving forward, Congress
should mandate that all federal elections be conducted using human-readable
paper ballots that are counted either by hand or by using federally certified
optical scanners.394
C. Congress Should Require All States to Submit to Federal Election Audits
As part of a federal election plan, Congress should require that all states
submit to post-election audits. Audits require voter-verifiable paper ballots that
provide a human-readable record of the voter’s selections.395 Such audits
provide assurance that the outcome of any election reflects the voters’ choices
and is based on an accurate tabulation of the ballots cast.396
NAS election cybersecurity experts recommend risk-limiting audits as the
most efficient and effective means to ensure the reliability of an election.397
Risk-limiting audits examine randomly selected, individual ballots until a
predetermined level of statistical assurance is reached.398 In 2017, risk-limiting
audits were piloted statewide in Colorado, and several other states plan to
conduct pilots in the next few years.399 However, rather than leaving the
requirement for audits to the discretion of states, Congress should pass
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legislation to require all states to submit to federal risk-limiting audits after each
federal election.
The federal government’s response to ongoing Russian cyberattacks must
extend beyond offers to provide resources to states.400 To protect and defend
U.S. elections, Congress must “establish mandatory nation-wide cybersecurity
requirements.”401 Such requirements must designate specific measures to ensure
the security of voter registration databases and pollbooks and should compel the
use of uniform paper ballots and post-election audits.
CONCLUSION
The right of citizens to freely choose who will represent them is the essence
of our republican form of government. The founders understood that
maintaining free and fair elections is a core tenet of this nation. Therefore, they
placed in the Constitution the means for Congress to have final authority to
regulate federal elections when the need arises. Russian cyberattacks on state
and local election systems constitute a challenge to the core values of American
democracy, which require a comprehensive, uniform federal response.
To varying degrees over the past 150 years, Congress has imposed
regulations on states to protect election integrity by ensuring that all citizens
have the right to vote. The current threat requires an even greater response. This
Comment describes a source of authority that authorizes Congress to prescribe
cybersecurity measures to which states must adhere in conducting federal
elections. The value implicit in the Elections Clause is that federal elections must
be administered in a manner that produces a clear and legitimate outcome.
Congress has the authority and an obligation under the Elections Clause to
ensure the integrity of American democracy in the face of cyberattacks by a
foreign adversary. Congress must exercise this power to create a comprehensive
national plan for federal elections.
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